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Abstract: In response to the global fight against climate change, a growing number of firms 
cooperate with their supply chain partners on green innovations. This study explores firms’ green 
R&D cooperation behaviour in a two-echelon supply chain in which a manufacturer and a retailer first 
cooperate to invest green R&D and then organise production according to a wholesale price contract. 
Through a comparison with non-cooperation models, we evaluate the effects of green R&D 
cooperation on the economic, environmental and social performances of the supply chain while 
simultaneously considering the technological spillover and supply chain power relationship. Our 
findings show that the R&D cooperation’s improvement of firms’ economic performance is mainly 
determined by firms’ own green contribution level. This level is dependent on firms’ green R&D 
investment efficiency and spillover as well as on their relevant power relationship with their supply 
chain partners. Interestingly, there is a Pareto improvement region in which the green R&D 
cooperation has a positive impact on firms, customers and the environment. In the case of a 
non-Pareto improvement region, supply chain coordination can be achieved through a two-part tariff 
contract. This applies to all three of the supply chain power structures investigated in this research.  
 






1 Introduction  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) recently published report has once again 
brought global warming to the world’s attention. The report calls for urgent and unprecedented 
changes to reach the target of keeping the temperature increase below 1.5 °C, which is above 
pre-industrial levels, in order to reduce the risks to humans, ecosystems and sustainable development 
(IPCC 2018). Meanwhile, the continuous political debates on and media exposures of climate change 
issues have further raised the general public’s environmental awareness. As a result, more customers 
are willing to pay premium prices for low-carbon products, and this shift in behaviour applies not only 
to environmentally conscious customers but also to the mainstream market (Bull, 2012; 
Kanchanapibul et al., 2014; Olsen et al., 2014). In this context, it is essential for companies to 
incorporate this increasing political and societal concern when developing effective green strategies to 
improve business competitiveness. 
    In response to the global fight against climate change, an increasing number of firms have been 
investing in green R&D and innovations with the aim to upgrade and modernise their operations and 
produce low-carbon products (Ishfaq et al., 2016; Liu and Chen, 2017). For example, in 2016, the Oil 
and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI), a group that includes ten of the world’s largest oil companies, 
created a fund to invest $1 billion in technologies to reduce carbon emissions from oil and natural gas 
(Pandey, 2016). The OGCI also stated that they would work closely with automotive manufacturers to 
increase vehicles’ efficiency (Pandey, 2016). Moreover, Lenovo, one of the world’s largest PC 
manufacturers, announced the breakthrough of an innovative low temperature solder manufacturing 
process, which reduces carbon emissions by 35% compared to the traditional PC manufacturing 
process (Lenovo Newsroom, 2017). In their climate change strategy, Lenovo also specified that the 
firm works with upstream/downstream partners to drive and facilitate carbon emissions reductions to 
support the transition to a low-carbon economy (Lenovo, 2016). In addition to individual efforts to 
make products and processes more carbon efficient, a growing industrial trend is to cooperate with 
upstream/downstream supply chain partners on green innovations and R&D to improve environmental 
performance (Vachon and Klassen, 2008; Caro et al., 2013).  
    Among the different modes of green R&D supply chain cooperation, one of the most common 




coordinate their green R&D decisions (Ishii, 2004; Ge et al., 2014; Yenipazarli, 2017). Through this 
mode, firms make green R&D decisions jointly to maximise the total profit of the partnership. 
Thereafter, the two firms make other operational decisions (e.g. prices and production quantity) 
sequentially to optimise their own profits in the second stage. However, while green R&D cooperation 
can have an immediate impact on unit carbon emissions reduction, it is likely to have a long-term 
effect of technological spillover, which refers to the diffusion of technology through technical 
exchanges or knowledge sharing between companies (Spenser, 2003; Ge et al., 2014). Technological 
spillover will have an impact on firms’ R&D investment decisions and their ability to share other 
firms’ innovations due to the spillover effect, which may damage firms’ enthusiasm for R&D 
investment (Isaksson et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2017). Adding to the complexity of the problem, firms often 
have different internal technological/operational capabilities (e.g. efficiency of green R&D investment 
and the inter-firm power relationship between the supply chain members). For instance, the 
manufacturers (e.g. Toyota and Ford) are the dominant force in the automotive industry, and 
supermarket chains (e.g. Walmart and Tesco) are the leading forces in the grocery retail industry. In 
contrast, there is a more balanced power relationship between telecom service providers (e.g. AT&T 
and O2) and major cell phone makers (e.g. Apple and Samsung) in the telecommunications industry. 
The above observations motivated us to investigate the following key questions: 
• Should firms cooperate with their supply chain partners on green R&D? If yes, what are the 
impacts of supply chain green R&D cooperation on firms, customers and the environment?  
• How does firms’ technological spillover affect supply chain firms’ strategic (competition vs. 
cooperation) and operational (e.g. prices and green R&D investment) decisions and their 
consequential economic, environmental and social performances? 
• What impact does the supply chain power structure have on firms’ strategic and operational 
decisions and on their consequential economic, environmental and social performances?  
Literature has increasingly focused on the importance of R&D cooperation for low carbon 
supply chain management. Previous research addressing this general question considered supply chain 
cooperation on green R&D and innovations (Dai et al., 2017; Ji et al., 2017; Yenipazarli, 2017), the 
spillover effect on R&D cooperation (Ge et al., 2014; Hu et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2017) and the effect 
of market and supply chain power structures on green cooperation (Shibata 2014; Chen et al. 2017b). 




decision behaviour on green R&D cooperation in the form of centralised decision-making on green 
R&D investment, which is a highly common option related to green R&D supply chain cooperation. 
More importantly, we simultaneously consider technological spillover and supply chain power 
structures when examining how green R&D cooperation affects firms’ financial performance, the 
customer surplus, the environment and social welfare. 
Using a game theoretical modelling approach, we find that green R&D cooperation between 
supply chain partners always positively affects the supply chain’s total profit, the environment, the 
customer surplus and social welfare. This finding applies to three supply chain power structures: 
Manufacturer Stackelberg, Vertical Nash, and Retailer Stackelberg. However, its impact on an 
individual firm’s financial performance is more complicated because it is dependent on the firm’s 
own green contribution level, which is determined by a firm’s green R&D investment efficiency and 
its technological spillovers, as well as how it compares to its supply chain partners’ contribution level. 
More importantly, we also find that in an asymmetric power structure, the supply chain leader should 
have a higher green contribution level than its follower in order to achieve sustainable green R&D 
cooperation that improves the cooperating firms’ profitability and benefits both customers and the 
environment. Our research findings make important practical contributions. Our structured and 
systematic examination provides supply chain firms with clear strategic guidance on how to cooperate 
with supply chain partners in green R&D and considers their unique internal and external 
circumstances. Moreover, our findings offer support to firms when making optimal strategic and 
operational decisions regarding green R&D cooperation, thereby improving their business 
competitiveness. For policymakers, our results could help the development of appropriate policies to 
promote green R&D cooperation between supply chain firms, thereby supporting a sustainable 
low-carbon economy.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: After reviewing the relevant literature in Section 2, 
Section 3 presents the cooperation and non-cooperation models and the equilibrium analysis. Then, in 
Section 4, we examine the impact of green R&D cooperation on firms’ operational decisions and the 
economic, environmental and social performances of the supply chain, while also considering 
different power relationships. We subsequently consider spillover as an endogenous variable in 
Section 5, examining its effects on supply chain firms’ decisions and performances. In Section 6, we 




conclude our study by highlighting research insights, managerial and policy implications and future 
research directions. 
 
2 Literature review 
The paper is relevant to several research areas: (1) carbon emissions-sensitive demand; (2) 
cooperation for low-carbon supply chain management; (3) R&D spillover effect in low-carbon supply 
chains; and (4) the power perspective on low-carbon supply chains. 
Due to increasing environmental awareness, an increasing number of customers are willing to 
pay a premium for low-carbon-attribute products (Olsen et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2017). Consequently, 
it is critical for firms to consider this shift in customer behaviour when making important strategic and 
operational decisions. This is also reflected in numerous previous studies on the incorporation of the 
carbon emissions-sensitive demand in determining pricing, ordering quantity and when making other 
supply chain decisions (Nouira et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2017). Using the 
newsvendor model, Du et al. (2015) studied firms’ behaviour and decision-making in the emission 
dependent supply chain. Their research found that the governmental environment policy and the 
market risk affect firms’ bargaining power. Moreover, Luo et al. (2016) investigated the green 
technology investment problem of two competitive and heterogeneous manufacturers under 
competition and coopetition settings. They employed a demand function affected by the price and the 
environmental property of product. Using a similar demand setting, Chen et al. (2017a) examined how 
the market power structure and competition related to price and emissions affect firms’ decisions and 
performances. The above two studies incorporated unit product carbon emissions as the 
environmental property in the demand function. In contrast, Xu et al. (2017) used the concept of 
carbon emissions intensity – i.e. the reduction in carbon emissions after the green technology 
investment – as the emissions attribute in their demand function. As customers are often more 
sensitive to the visible efforts of firms’ low-carbon practices (Wang et al., 2017), we assume in this 
study that customer demand is sensitive to the reduction in unit carbon emissions (Xu et al., 2017) 
rather than unit product carbon emissions (Luo et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2017a).  
Another relevant focus in literature stream considers supply chain environmental cooperation 




investigation of Canadian manufacturing plants, Klassen and Vachon (2003) discovered that supply 
chain collaboration has a significant impact on both the form and level of environmental technology 
investments. Other studies, e.g. Zhu et al. (2010) and Green et al. (2012), have also supported the 
view that supply chain members’ environmental cooperation improves both environmental and 
economic performances and is critical for the success of a circular economy initiative. In addition, Jira 
and Toffel (2013) used data from the Carbon Disclosure Project’s Supply Chain Program to 
investigate the conditions under which supply chain members are likely to coordinate efforts to 
address climate change.  
More recently, Ji et al. (2017) investigated cooperation between a manufacturer and a retailer and 
considered online and offline shops. They also focused on how the cap-and-trade policy affects both 
economic performance and social welfare through modelling supply chain firms’ emissions reduction 
behaviours. Moreover, and relevant to this research, Yenipazarli (2017) studied the impact of 
collaboration through supply chain contracts on suppliers’ investment in the carbon emissions 
reduction of their product/production process and the consequential environmental impact on a supply 
chain. Further, Dai et al. (2017) applied a game-theoretical approach to examine two cooperative 
mechanisms between two supply chain members on green R&D investment: cartelisation and a 
cost-sharing contract. However, neither study considered technological spillover – an important 
element in green technology investment – and only one supply chain power structure setting was used. 
For instance, Yenipazarli (2017) assumed the downstream retailer as the Stackelberg leader; in 
contrast, Dai et al. (2017) assumed the upstream member as the Stackelberg leader. In fact, both 
spillover and supply chain power relationships have a significant impact on firms’ decisions and 
performances, which will be further discussed below.  
Technological spillovers refer to the diffusion of technology through a technical exchange or 
knowledge sharing between companies (Spenser, 2003; Ge et al., 2014). Despite growing interest 
among academics over the last two decades, the interface between technology cooperation and supply 
chain management remains an under-studied topic. Among the few studies conducted, Ge et al. (2014) 
considered spillover as an endogenous factor in their investigation of optimal choice between 
cooperative R&D investment and cartelisation. In another study involving a competitive setting of 
two manufacturers and one supplier, Wang et al. (2014) explored the potential impact of spillover on 




the contracting pricing and emissions reduction of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer 
and a manufacturer and found that technological spillovers amplify the impact of free-ride behaviour. 
Moreover, Hu et al. (2017) used the concept of technological spillover to examine the supply-side 
implications of open technologies. They determined that firms must understand the supply chain 
context and open technologies’ far-reaching impact prior to reaching decisions on technology 
strategies. Even fewer studies have considered the effect of vertical technological spillovers on firms’ 
decisions and performances in the context of a low-carbon supply chain. Among them, Xu et al. (2017) 
considered technological spillover in their investigation of supply chain decisions and coordination. 
However, in their research, technological spillover was viewed as reducing the production cost but not 
carbon emissions, which is not reasonable for green technology investment.  
Numerous prior studies related to supply chain management have considered power relationships 
in various research problems (Shi et al., 2013; Benton and Maloni, 2005; Chen and Wang, 2015). For 
instance, Shibata (2014) examined R&D investment spillovers across different market structures and 
found that non-cooperative R&D is likely preferred as competition intensifies. However, the study 
was not conducted in the context of green/low-carbon supply chain management. Additionally, based 
on their investigation of power influences on organisational responses to the implementation of 
sustainability practices, Touboulic et al. (2014) claimed that the power dynamics between supply 
chain partners affect the sharing of sustainability-related value and risks. Further, and also from a 
power perspective, Chen et al. (2017b) applied a game-theoretic approach to analyse the impact of 
supply chain power relationships on firms’ decisions as well as the economic and environmental 
performances of a two-echelon supply chain. Based on their research, they found that supply chain 
power relationships have a significant impact on economic and environmental performance. Different 
from the previous literature, our research models R&D cooperation behaviour for the low-carbon 
supply chain and considers carbon emissions sensitive demand, technological spillover and the supply 
chain power structure.  
In summary, despite increasing interest among practitioners and academics and an increasing 
number of studies on environment cooperation covering various aspects including power relationships, 
technological spillover and coordination, to be best of our knowledge, there is limited research that 
simultaneously takes into account all those important aspects when exploring the role of R&D 




literature and systematically analyse the influence of these factors in relation to the impact of green 
R&D cooperation regarding supply chain firms’ financial performance, consumer surplus, the 
environment and social welfare. 
 
3. The models and equilibrium analysis 
3.1. The model 
We consider a two-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer 
purchases products from the manufacturer and then sells them to end customers. The demand faced by 
the retailer is price- and carbon emissions-sensitive, and the decision variables of the retailer are the 
retail price and green R&D investment, which are directly associated with unit carbon emissions 
reduction. The decision variables of the manufacturer are the wholesale price and its green R&D 
investment. There are two stages game involved in the supply chain as illustrated in Figure 1. In the 
first stage game, the manufacturer and retailer make strategic decision on green R&D investment and 
they decide whether to cooperate with their supply chain partner in the form of centralized decision on 
green R&D investment. In the second stage game, the manufacturer and retailer make operational 
decision on wholesale and retail prices and the sequence of decisions depends on supply chain power 
structures including Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Vertical Nash (VN), and Retailer Stackelberg 
(RS). Throughout this paper, we use the notations presented in Table 1. 
 
Figure 1: Decision framework 
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In consideration of the literature (Tsay and Agrawal, 2000; Luo et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2017), the 
demand faced by the retailer is 𝑞 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 + 𝛾(𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟 + 𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚 + 𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟). 𝛼  is the maximum 
market demand (end-customer demand). 𝛽 and 𝛾 are the price sensitivity and carbon emissions 
reduction sensitivity, respectively (Xu et al., 2017): 𝛽 > 0  and 𝛾 > 0 . Without green R&D 
investment, 𝑞 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 > 0 ; then 𝑞0 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 > 0 . For the non-cooperation model, the 
manufacturer’s profit 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) is: 




2  (1) 
The first part of the formula represents the wholesale profit on the product, and the second part 
indicates the manufacturer’s green R&D investment.  
Table 1: Notations 
Notation Descriptions 
𝑐 Unit production cost, which includes the material cost and the process cost. 
𝑤 Unit wholesale price, 𝑤 > 𝑐. 
𝑝 Unit retail price, 𝑝 > 𝑤. 
𝑞 Demand faced by the retailer. 
𝑒𝑚, 𝑒𝑟 
Unit carbon emissions reduction after the green R&D investment of the manufacturer and 
retailer, respectively. 
𝐸 
Total carbon emissions reduction after the green R&D investment of the manufacturer and 
retailer, 𝐸 = (𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)𝑞. 
𝑡𝑚, 𝑡𝑟 Green R&D investment cost coefficient of the manufacturer and retailer, respectively. 
𝑇𝑚, 𝑇𝑟 









𝜃𝑚, 𝜃𝑟  
The spillover rate of the manufacturer and retailer to its partner, respectively, 0 ≤ 𝜃𝑚 ≤ 1, 
0 ≤ 𝜃𝑟 ≤ 1. 
𝜋𝑚 (𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) Manufacturer’s profit. 
𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) Retailer’s profit. 





𝑐𝑒 The cost of controlling environmental pollution caused by unit carbon emissions. 
 𝑆𝑊 Social welfare, 𝑆𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋𝑚 (𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) + 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) + 𝑐𝑒𝐸. 
𝑀 The retailer’s lump-sum payment to the manufacturer. 
 









The supply chain’s profit in the cooperation model is: 
𝜋𝑡
𝑐(𝑒𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) = 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) + 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟)                      (3) 
The supply chain’s profit in the non-cooperation model is: 
𝜋𝑡
𝑛(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) = 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) + 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟)                    (4) 
3.2 Non-cooperation models 
We first investigate non-cooperation models as a benchmark. Below, we describe the decision 
sequences for three power structures (MS, VN and RS) in the non-cooperation models. Each model 
includes two stages. 
MS non-cooperation model: In the first stage, the manufacturer and retailer independently and 
simultaneously decide on their individual green R&D investments to maximise their own profits. In 
the second stage, the manufacturer offers a wholesale price 𝑤; then the retailer decides on its retail 









𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) → 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) 
VN non-cooperation model: In the first stage, the manufacturer and retailer independently and 
simultaneously decide on their individual green R&D investments to maximise their own profits. In 
the second stage, the manufacturer and retailer independently and simultaneously decide on their 
wholesale price and retail price, respectively. Thus, the process of the VN non-cooperation model can 















RS non-cooperation model: In the first stage, the manufacturer and retailer independently and 
simultaneously decide on their individual green R&D investments to maximise their own profits. In 
the second stage, the retailer offers a retail price 𝑝; then the manufacturer decides on its wholesale 















All three models are multi-stage non-cooperative games, and we can use backward induction to 
solve them. Table 2 lists the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price (𝑤𝑛𝑗) and unit carbon emissions 
reduction after green R&D investment (𝑒𝑚
𝑛𝑗
), as well as the retailer’s optimal retail price (𝑝𝑛𝑗) and 
unit carbon emissions reduction after green R&D investment (𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑗
) for non-cooperation, where 𝑗 =
𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑛 represents the MS, VN and RS models, respectively. 
 
3.3 Cooperation models 
In this section, we explore the cooperation models and describe the decision sequences for three 
power structures (MS, VN and RS) in these models. Environmental cooperation in this study is 
modelled through centralised decision making for a green R&D investment decision. In contrast to the 
integrated supply chain in which all the decisions (e.g. prices and/or production quantity decisions) 
are centralised, the manufacturer and the retailer individually make the wholesale and retail price 
decision following the joint green R&D investment decision. Each model includes two stages. 
MS cooperation model: In the first stage, the manufacturer and retailer jointly decide on green 
R&D investments to maximise the supply chain’s total profit. In the second stage, the manufacturer 
offers a wholesale price 𝑤; then the retailer decides on its retail price 𝑝 in response. Thus, the 
process of the MS cooperation model can be described as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝑚,𝑒𝑟
𝜋𝑡(𝑒𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) → 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤
𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) → 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝
𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) 
VN cooperation model: In the first stage, the manufacturer and retailer jointly decide on green 
R&D investments to maximise the supply chain’s total profit. In the second stage, the manufacturer 
and retailer simultaneously decide on their wholesale and retail prices. Thus, the process of the VN 
cooperation model can be described as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝑚,𝑒𝑟








RS cooperation model: In the first stage, the manufacturer and retailer jointly decide on green 
R&D investments to maximise the supply chain’s total profit. In the second stage, the retailer offers a 
retail price 𝑝; then the manufacturer decides on its wholesale price 𝑤 in response. Thus, the process 
of the RS cooperation model can be described as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝑚,𝑒𝑟
𝜋𝑡(𝑒𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) → 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝






All three models are multi-stage games, and we can use backward induction to solve them. Table 
2 lists the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price ( 𝑤𝑐𝑗) and unit carbon emissions reduction after 
green R&D investment(𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑗
). It also lists the retailer’s optimal retail price ( 𝑝𝑐𝑗 ) and unit carbon 
emissions reduction after green R&D investment (𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑗
) for cooperation, where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑛 represents 
the MS, VN and RS models, respectively. 
 
Table 2: Optimal decisions associated with the non-cooperation and cooperation models 






𝛽(2 − 2𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟)
 𝑐 +
3𝑞0
𝛽(9 − 8𝐺𝑚 − 8𝐺𝑟)
 𝑐 +
𝑞0




2𝛽(2 − 2𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟)
 𝑤𝑛𝑣 +
3𝑞0
𝛽(9 − 8𝐺𝑚 − 8𝐺𝑟)
 𝑤𝑛𝑟 +
𝑞0






2𝑡𝑚𝛽(2 − 2𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟)
 
2𝑞0𝛾(1 + 𝜃𝑚)
𝑡𝑚𝛽(9 − 8𝐺𝑚 − 8𝐺𝑟)
 
𝑞0𝛾(1 + 𝜃𝑚)






4𝑡𝑟𝛽(2 − 2𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟)
 
2𝑞0𝛾(1 + 𝜃𝑟)
𝑡𝑟𝛽(9 − 8𝐺𝑚 − 8𝐺𝑟)
 
𝑞0𝛾(1 + 𝜃𝑟)




𝑤𝑐𝑗  𝑐 +
𝑞0
𝛽(2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟)
 𝑐 +
3𝑞0
𝛽(9 − 16𝐺𝑚 − 16𝐺𝑟)
 𝑐 +
𝑞0
2𝛽(2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟)
 
𝑝𝑐𝑗  𝑤𝑐𝑚 +
𝑞0
2𝛽(2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟)
 𝑤𝑐𝑣 +
3𝑞0
𝛽(9 − 16𝐺𝑚 − 16𝐺𝑟)
 𝑤𝑐𝑟 +
𝑞0






4𝑡𝑚𝛽(2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟)
 
4𝑞0𝛾(1 + 𝜃𝑚)
𝑡𝑚𝛽(9 − 16𝐺𝑚 − 16𝐺𝑟)
 
3𝑞0𝛾(1 + 𝜃𝑚)






4𝑡𝑟𝛽(2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟)
 
4𝑞0𝛾(1 + 𝜃𝑟)
𝑡𝑟𝛽(9 − 16𝐺𝑚 − 16𝐺𝑟)
 
3𝑞0𝛾(1 + 𝜃𝑟)
4𝑡𝑟𝛽(2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟)
 








. 𝐺𝑖  decreases in its own green R&D 
investment cost coefficient (𝑡𝑖), but it increases in its spillover rate to its partner (𝜃𝑖). In this sense, 𝐺𝑖 
indicates the green contribution level of the manufacturer (𝑖 = 𝑚) and retailer (𝑖 = 𝑟) and their 
cooperation in the supply chain. Thus, 𝐺𝑚 represents the manufacturer’s green contribution level, and 
𝐺𝑟 represents the retailer’s green contribution level. The green R&D investment cost coefficient (𝑡𝑖) 
decreases in the green R&D investment efficiency. A low value of the coefficient indicates a higher 
level of investment efficiency, meaning that it requires less investment to achieve the same amount of 
reduction in unit carbon emissions. A high value of the coefficient indicates a lower level of 
investment efficiency, meaning that it requires more investment to achieve the same amount of 




To guarantee the existence of prices and carbon emissions reduction decisions in the MS and RS 
models, we assume that: 




Similarly, to guarantee the existence of prices and carbon emissions reduction decisions in the 
VN model, we assume that: 




These types of assumptions appeared frequently in the literature (Ge et al., 2014; Gupta, 2008). 
The above conditions, (GC) and (GCV), mean that the green contribution level of the manufacturer 
and the retailer should not be too large. In other words, the green R&D investment cost coefficient of 
both the manufacturer and the retailer (𝑡𝑚 and 𝑡𝑟) cannot be too small. A small value of 𝑡𝑚 and 𝑡𝑟 
will reduce firms’ incentives to invest in green R&D. 
 
4 Effects of cooperation 
In this section, we examine the effects of green R&D investment cooperation on firms’ decisions 
regarding prices and green R&D investment level; the consequential economic performance of each 
firm individually and the supply chain as a whole; and the impacts on the environment and customers. 
4.1 The effects of cooperation on firms’ decisions 

















, 𝑤𝑐𝑗 > 𝑤𝑛𝑗, 𝑝𝑐𝑗 > 𝑝𝑛𝑗, 𝑞𝑐𝑗 >  𝑞𝑛𝑗, 
where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
This lemma means that in each supply chain power structure, compared to the non-cooperation 
model, both the manufacturer and the retailer will invest more in green R&D in the cooperation model 
and achieve a greater reduction in their unit carbon emissions after green R&D investment. This is in 
line with the existing literature claiming that supply chain cooperation increases the level of green 
technology investment and improves environmental performance (Klassen and Vachon, 2003; Vachon 
and Klassen, 2008). It also leads to higher wholesale and retail prices. Although the retail price is 
higher in the cooperation model than in the non-cooperation model, demand in the cooperation model 
is higher than that in the non-cooperation model due to customers’ sensitivity to firms’ carbon 




4.2 The effect of cooperation on profits 
Knowing whether cooperation can improve firms’ profits can help managers to make better 
cooperation decisions. Therefore, we first derive the following proposition regarding cooperation’s 









, 𝑝𝑛𝑗 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑗
), where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
Proposition 1 implies that, in each power structure, the supply chain’s profit is always higher in 
the cooperation model than in the non-cooperation model. It supports Zhu et al. (2010) and Green et 
al.’s (2012) view that environmental cooperation within the supply chain improves not only its 
environmental performance but also its economic performance. This can be explained by the fact that, 
in the green R&D investment stage, the cooperation model’s objective is to maximise the supply 
chain’s total profit, while the non-cooperation model’s objective is to maximise each individual firm’s 
profit. Since the green R&D cooperation is in the form of centralized decision on the two firms’ green 
R&D investment, the cooperation cost is insignificant and assumed to not incur additional cost. 
Therefore, the green R&D investment cooperation always increases the total profit of the supply 
chain.  
Now, we look at the impact of green R&D cooperation on individual firms’ financial 
performance. To determine the effect of cooperation on the manufacturer’s financial performance, we 
have the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: (1) In the MS model, if 0 < 𝐺𝑚 < 𝑓𝑟








































(3) In the RS model, if 0 < 𝐺𝑟 <
4
9
 and 0 < 𝐺𝑚 < 𝑓𝑟



















𝑟(𝐺𝑟) < 𝐺𝑚 <
2
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 and 0 < 𝐺𝑚 < 𝑓𝑟











For the manufacturer, parts (1) and (2) of Proposition 2 mean that when there is no cooperation 
cost, whether its profit increases or decreases in the MS and VN power structures depends on its own 
green contribution level. More specifically, if its green contribution level is lower than a critical 
threshold (𝑓𝑟
𝑚(𝐺𝑟) in MS or 𝑓𝑟
𝑣(𝐺𝑟) in VN), which is related to the retailer’s green contribution 
level, then the manufacturer will gain more profit in the cooperation model than in the 
non-cooperation model. On the contrary, if the manufacturer’s green contribution is higher than the 
threshold, then it will gain less profit in the cooperation model than in the non-cooperation model.  
In the RS power structure, part (3) of Proposition 2 means that when there is no cooperation cost, 
whether the manufacturer’s profit increases or decreases depends on the green contribution level of 
both the retailer and the manufacturer. More specifically, if the retailer’s green contribution level is 
low (high) and the manufacturer’s green contribution level is also lower (higher) than a critical 
threshold, 𝑓𝑟
𝑟(𝐺𝑟), which is related to the retailer’s green contribution level, then the manufacturer 
will gain more profit in the cooperation model than in the non-cooperation model. In this case, the 
green contribution level of the manufacturer, a follower, matches the green contribution level of the 
retailer, a leader. On the contrary, if the retailer’s green contribution level is low (high) but the 
manufacturer’s green contribution level is higher (lower) than 𝑓𝑟
𝑟(𝐺𝑟), then the manufacturer will 
gain less profit in the cooperation model than in the non-cooperation model. In this case, there is a 
mismatch between the green contribution levels of the manufacturer (Stackelberg follower) and the 
retailer (Stackelberg leader). 
To determine the effect of cooperation on the retailer’s financial performance, we have the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 3: (1) In the MS model, if 0 < 𝐺𝑚 <
4
9
 and 0 < 𝐺𝑟 < 𝑓𝑚































 and 0 < 𝐺𝑟 < 𝑓𝑚





















































For the retailer, part (1) of Proposition 3 means that when there is no cooperation cost, whether 
its profit increases or decreases in the MS power structure depends on the green contribution level of 
both the manufacturer and the retailer. More specifically, if the manufacturer’s green contribution 
level is low (high) and the retailer’s green contribution level is also lower (higher) than a critical 
threshold, 𝑓𝑚
𝑚(𝐺𝑚), which is related to the manufacturer’s green contribution level, then the retailer 
will gain more profit in the cooperation model than in the non-cooperation model. On the contrary, if 
the manufacturer’s green contribution level is low (high) but the retailer’s green contribution level is 
higher (lower) than 𝑓𝑚
𝑚(𝐺𝑚), then the retailer will gain less profit in the cooperation model than in 
the non-cooperation model. Parts (2) and (3) of Proposition 3 mean that, in the VN and RS power 
structures, whether the retailer’s profit increases or decreases depends on its own green contribution 
level. More specifically, this level is lower than the critical thresholds (𝑓𝑚
𝑣(𝐺𝑚) in VN and 𝑓𝑚
𝑟(𝐺𝑚) 
in RS), which are related to the manufacturer’s green contribution level. Therefore, the retailer will 
gain more profit in the cooperation model than in the non-cooperation model. On the contrary, if the 
retailer’s green contribution is higher than the threshold, then the retailer will gain less profit in the 
cooperation model than in the non-cooperation model.  
From the analysis of Propositions 2 and 3, we learn that when the Stackelberg leader’s green 
contribution level is low, the leader can gain economic benefits through cooperation, as a joint 
decision on green R&D investment will increase the supply chain’s total profit (Proposition 1). With 
superior power over its supply chain partner and a low green contribution level, which are reflected in 
low R&D investment and/or low technological spillover, it is more likely for the leader to receive a 




level is high, the leader cannot benefit economically through cooperation since it contributes more to 
the increased total profits. Therefore, in this case, it is better for the leader not to engage in green 
cooperation.  
Similarly, in the symmetric power structure, the decision regarding cooperation is mainly 
dependent on each supply chain member’s own green contribution level. Although cooperation will 
increase total profits, distribution of the increased profits is more balanced in the symmetric power 
structure. Therefore, it is more beneficial to engage in green cooperation when each supply chain 
member’s own green contribution level is low. Intuitively, firms can gain more benefit to cooperate 
with the supply chain partners that are more advanced or capable of green R&D. For Stackelberg 
followers, economic benefits can only be gained when the manufacturer’s and retailer’s green 
contribution levels match. When followers have a higher green contribution level as compared to 
Stackelberg leaders, they will lose out by contributing more to the increased profit but receiving a 
smaller share of it due to their relevant weaker power in the contract negotiation of wholesale price. 
Alternatively, cooperation does not take place if the leader has a higher green contribution level. 
Compared to existing studies (Dai et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2017), the above analysis captures a much 
wider range of outcomes for green R&D cooperation’s impacts on firms’ financial performance. Prior 
works, e.g. Dai et al. (2017) and Xu et al. (2017), have only considered the supply chain setting of the 
upstream supplier as the Stackelberg leader and the downstream manufacturer as the Stackelberg 
follower. 
The above analysis indicates that cooperation could have a positive or negative impact on 
individual firms’ economic performance. Supply chain firms face the dilemma of profit maximisation 
for individual firms and/or the supply chain as a whole (Chen et al., 2017b). To ensure the success of 
supply chain cooperation, it is critical to achieve a win-win outcome for both parties. Therefore, from 
Propositions 2 and 3, we derive the following corollary, as shown in Figure 2: 
Corollary 1: If 0 < 𝐺𝑚 < 𝑓𝑟
𝑗
(𝐺𝑟)  and 0 < 𝐺𝑟 < 𝑓𝑚
𝑗


















(a) Pareto area in the MS model 
 
(b) Pareto area in the VN model 
 
(c) Pareto area in the RS model 
Figure 2: Pareto area in different supply chain power structures 
As Figure 2 shows, in each power structure, if the green contribution levels of the manufacturer 
and the retailer are lower than the corresponding thresholds, which are related to their partner’s green 
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non-cooperation model. In this scenario, the manufacturer and retailer prefer cooperation, thus leading 
to a win-win situation. Furthermore, the area for this Pareto improvement region varies between 
different supply chain power structures. For instance, in the MS model, this decision region is 
positioned in the area where 𝑓𝑚
𝑚(𝐺𝑚) < 𝑓𝑟
𝑚(𝐺𝑟). In the RS model, this decision region is positioned in 
the area where 𝑓𝑟
𝑟(𝐺𝑟) < 𝑓𝑚
𝑟(𝐺𝑚), which means that the Pareto area of green R&D investment 
cooperation will only exist if the Stackelberg leader contributes more than the Stackelberg follower. In 
the VN model, this decision region is placed in the area where 𝑓𝑟
𝑛(𝐺𝑟) = 𝑓𝑚
𝑛(𝐺𝑚). The results support 
Touboulic et al.’s (2014) view that the power relationship markedly influences the sharing of 
sustainability-related value between supply chain members. Therefore, to sustain the green R&D 
cooperation in the supply chain and maximize the impact on carbon emission reduction, it is essential 
for supply chain leaders to make more contribution towards green R&D. Figure 2 also shows that in 
each supply chain power structure, besides the area for Pareto improvement, there exist two feasible 
regions in which one firm benefits from cooperation while the other is worse off. In such a case, the 
latter firm will certainly not embrace green cooperation with the supply chain partner. Therefore, it is 
important to fairly distribute the financial benefit gained from the green R&D cooperation. 
4.3 The effect of cooperation on customers and the environment 
Regarding the effect of cooperation on customers and the environment, we have the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 4: 𝐸𝑐𝑗 > 𝐸𝑛𝑗,  𝐶𝑆𝑐𝑗 >  𝐶𝑆𝑛𝑗 and 𝑆𝑊𝑐𝑗 > 𝑆𝑊𝑛𝑗, where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
As Proposition 4 represents, in each power structure, the total carbon emissions reduction after 
green R&D investment is greater in the cooperation model than in the non-cooperation model, which 
benefits the environment. At the same time, although the retail price is higher in the cooperation 
model than in the non-cooperation model, the customer surplus is also higher in the former than in the 
latter. This is because the extent of environmental performance improvement is more substantial than 
the increase of the retail price. Thus, cooperation also benefits customers. Therefore, where Pareto 
improvement can be achieved through cooperation, as highlighted in Figure 2, it is a sustainable 
strategy that not only improves the supply chain’s economic performance but also contributes to the 





5 Effects of spillover 
Section 4’s analysis indicates that firms’ green contribution level, which is influenced by their green 
R&D investment cost coefficients and spillovers, significantly impacts their strategic decisions on 
green R&D cooperation. In addition, firms can voluntarily increase spillover by improving 
communication or knowledge transfer (Ge et al., 2014). Therefore, in this section, we regard spillover 
as an endogenous factor and examine its effects on supply chain firms’ decisions and performances. 
5.1 The effects of spillover on decisions 
Regarding the effects of spillover on decisions, we have the following proposition: 








, 𝑤𝑛𝑗,  𝑝𝑛𝑗, and  𝑞𝑛𝑗 all 
increase in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑟, where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 








, 𝑤𝑐𝑗,  𝑝𝑐𝑗, and  𝑞𝑐𝑗 all increase in 𝜃𝑚 
and 𝜃𝑟, where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
Part (1) of Lemma 2 means that in each power structure, for the non-cooperation model, if the 
manufacturer’s or retailer’s spillover is enhanced, then both the manufacturer and the retailer will 
invest more in green R&D and achieve greater reductions in their unit carbon emissions. This also 
leads to higher wholesale and retail prices. Moreover, due to customers’ environmental awareness, 
demand increases. Part (2) of Lemma 2 implies that in each power structure, the findings for the 
non-cooperation model also apply to the cooperation model. This result demonstrates that, in order to 
maximize the positive impact on carbon emission reduction, firms should always seek ways (e.g., 
improved communication or knowledge transfer) to enhance technological spillover regardless of 
green R&D cooperation or not. 
5.2 The effects of spillover on profits 
Regarding the effects of spillover on the profits of the retailer, manufacturer and the whole supply 
chain, we have the following proposition: 












) increase in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑟, where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
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𝑐𝑚) increases (decreases) in 𝜃𝑟; only if 𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟 =
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𝑐𝑚) achieve their maximum profits.  
b) For the VN cooperation model, if 𝐺𝑚 > 𝐺𝑟 (𝐺𝑚 < 𝐺𝑟) , then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑐, 𝑒𝑚
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(increases) in  𝜃𝑚  and 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐 , 𝑒𝑟
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𝑐𝑟) achieve their maximum profits. 
For the non-cooperation model, part (1) of Proposition 5 means that, in each power structure, 
enhancing a firm’s spillover will increase the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits. Therefore, it is 
beneficial for both firms to enhance their technological spillovers. Recalling Lemma 2, an enhanced 
spillover will encourage firms to invest more in green R&D and further reduce their carbon emissions, 
thereby improving both economic and environmental performance. 
For the cooperation model, part (2) of Proposition 5 implies that, in each power structure, if a 
firm’s spillover is enhanced, then both its partner and the supply chain overall will gain more profits; 
consequently, each firm seeks the enhancement of its partner’s spillover. This is different in the 
non-cooperation model scenario, in which both firms are willing to enhance their spillover. This 
finding is in line with Ge et al. (2014), who observed that, economically, the enhancement of each 
firm’s spillover always benefits its partner and the supply chain overall. It is even more important to 
fairly distribute the extra profits derived from the cooperation. Otherwise, there is no incentive for 
firms to increase their own technological spillover, and the whole supply chain will suffer in the long 
run.  
Part (3) of Proposition 5 represents that, for the cooperation model, the spillover’s effect on each 
firm’s own profit is more complex. More specifically, if the green contribution level difference 
between the manufacturer and retailer is high in the MS power structure (𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟 >
2
9
), if the 
manufacturer’s green contribution level is higher than the retailer’s in the VN power structure (𝐺𝑚 >




RS power structure (𝐺𝑟 − 𝐺𝑚 >
2
9
), then the retailer’s profit increases in its spillover but the 
manufacturer’s profit decreases in its spillover. Therefore, the manufacturer is incentivised to decrease 
its spillover and the retailer is incentivised to increase its spillover until their green contribution level 
difference reaches the corresponding threshold (𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟 =
2
9
 for MS; 𝐺𝑚 = 𝐺𝑟 for VN; 𝐺𝑟 − 𝐺𝑚 >
2
9
 for RS).  
On the contrary, if the green contribution level difference between the manufacturer and retailer 
is low in the MS power structure (𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟 <
2
9
), if the manufacturer’s green contribution level is 
lower than the retailer’s in the VN power structure (𝐺𝑚 < 𝐺𝑟), or if the green contribution level 




the retailer’s profit decreases in its spillover but the manufacturer’s profit increases in its spillover. 
Therefore, the manufacturer is incentivised to increase its spillover and the retailer is incentivised to 
decrease its spillover until their green contribution level difference reaches the corresponding 
threshold (𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟 =
2
9
 for MS; 𝐺𝑚 = 𝐺𝑟  for VN; 𝐺𝑟 − 𝐺𝑚 =
2
9
 for RS). At this point, the 
manufacturer and retailer both achieve their maximum profits. We refer to the threshold as the 
balanced threshold, at which firms gain the largest economic benefits from supply chain cooperation. 
This is in line with the finding of Ge et al. (2014), who defined the threshold as a critical line and 
claimed that no firm has any incentive to enhance its spillover at the critical line. In this case, there is 
no need for firms to adjust their spillovers, which leads to changes in their green contribution levels. 
This is in line with Corollary 1, i.e. that two firms should match their green contribution levels in the 
cooperation model. 
From Proposition 5, we derive the following corollary: 
Corollary 2: (1) In the asymmetric power structure (MS and RS) models, when the leader has a 
higher green contribution level than the follower to the critical thresholds, cooperation delivers the 
largest economic benefits for the manufacturer and the retailer.  
(2) In the symmetric power structure (VN) model, when the manufacturer’s and retailer’s green 
contribution levels are equal, cooperation delivers the largest economic benefits for both the 
manufacturer and the retailer. 




Regarding the effects of spillover on customers and the environment, we have the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 6: 𝐸𝑛𝑗,  𝐸𝑐𝑗,   𝐶𝑆𝑛𝑗,  𝐶𝑆𝑐𝑗, 𝑆𝑊𝑛𝑗, and 𝑆𝑊𝑐𝑗 all increase in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑟, where 
𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
Proposition 6 means that, in each power structure, for both the non-cooperation model and the 
cooperation model, if a firm’s technological spillover is enhanced, then the manufacturer and retailer 
will invest more in green R&D, thus leading to a greater customer surplus and higher social welfare. 
In other words, enhancing a firm’s technological spillover will benefit the environment, customers 
and social welfare. Therefore, it is important for supply chain firms to promote technical exchange 
and/or knowledge sharing between them to increase the diffusion of low carbon technology and, in 
turn, achieve the sustainability objectives. 
 
6. Supply chain coordination 
In this section, we focus on supply chain coordination and discuss how coordination can be achieved 
through two-part tariff contract payments under three different supply chain power structures (MS, 
VN and RS). 
6.1 Integrated supply chain model 
The supply chain’s profit in an integrated supply chain model is: 
𝜋𝑡





2)     (5) 
In the first stage, the supply chain decides on green R&D investments to maximise the supply 
chain’s total profit. In the second stage, the supply chain decides on its retail price 𝑝 to maximise the 
supply chain’s total profit. Although the strategic and operational decisions are centralised in the 
integrated supply chain mode, it is logical to keep the two-stage game that the supply chain makes the 
centralized green R&D investment decision first, and then follows with the centralized price decision. 




𝐼(𝑒𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) → 𝑚𝑎𝑥
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𝐼(𝑒𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) 
As to the optimal unit carbon emissions reduction of the manufacturer (𝑒𝑚
𝐼 ), the optimal unit 
carbon emissions reduction of the retailer (𝑒𝑟
𝐼) and the optimal retail price (𝑝𝐼) in an integrated supply 

















This lemma means that in an integrated supply chain, there are unique optimal retail prices and 
optimal unit carbon emissions reductions for both manufacturers and retailers. 
6.2 Two-part tariff contract model 
For the two-part tariff contract model, the manufacturer’s profit 𝜋𝑚
𝑖 (𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) is: 
 𝜋𝑚




2 + 𝑀 (6) 
Similarly, for the two-part tariff contract model, the retailer’s profit 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) is: 
 𝜋𝑟




2 − 𝑀 (7) 
Regarding the supply chain coordination with the two-part tariff contract, the following 
proposition is obtained: 
Proposition 7: The supply chain can be coordinated with the two-part tariff contract, and the 

























2  in the RS power structure. 
This proposition shows that two-part tariff contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve 
Pareto improvement. It demonstrates that the manufacturer and retailer can earn more profits than 
those without the supply chain coordination. Under the contract, the manufacturer undertakes 
investment in green technology and generates revenue from product sales as well as a lump-sum 
payment from the retailer. The retailer provides this lump-sum payment to compensate the 
manufacturer’s green R&D investment in order to achieve the supply chain coordination. The 
two-part tariff contract ensures both parties can benefit from the extra profits derived from the green 
R&D investment cooperation. The optimal amount of this lump-sum payment is determined by a 
combination of factors including the price sensitivity (𝛽) and the green contribution level of the 
manufacturer and retailer (𝐺𝑚, 𝐺𝑟). It varies among different supply chain power structures. 





Corollary 3: 𝑀𝑚 > 𝑀𝑣 > 𝑀𝑟 
This corollary indicates that the supply chain power relationship has a significant impact on the 
retailer’s lump-sum payment to the manufacturer. In the MS power structure, a higher lump-sum 
payment will be paid to the manufacturer. In contrast, in the RS power structure, a lower lump-sum 
payment will be paid to the manufacturer. It shows that while both the manufacturer and retailer can 
gain benefit from the extra profits derived from the cooperation, the extent of this financial gain is 
influenced by the supply chain power relationship. In the two-part tariff contract, to meet the 
coordination condition 𝑤 = 𝑐, the retailer takes all the profits, and the profit gain needs to be 
redistributed to the manufacturer to achieve coordination. The manufacturer or retailer will benefit 
from the Stackelberg leader position in the negotiation of the two-part tariff contract to splice a large 
portion of an extended business pie. This finding is in line with that of existing literature (Touboulic 
et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2017b)—i.e. that a dominant power enables firms to gain financial advantage 
in a contract negotiation with weaker supplier chain partners. Therefore, it is more likely in the 
balanced supply chain power structure that the extra profits derived from the green R&D investment 
cooperation can be fairly distributed among the supply chain parties.  
 
7 Conclusion 
This research investigated a supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer first cooperate to 
invest in green R&D and then organise production under a wholesale price contract. Through a 
comparison with non-cooperation models, we focused on evaluating the effect of green R&D 
cooperation on the supply chain’s economic, environmental and social performances. We also 
explored how technology spillover affects supply chain firms’ strategic decision regarding green R&D 
cooperation, as well as the supply chain’s sustainability performance. We systematically analysed 
these research problems in three supply chain power structures to examine the moderating effect of 
the power relationship on the effects of green R&D cooperation and spillover. Under the same setting, 
we discussed how the supply chain can be coordinated through a two-part tariff contract.  
    Our main research findings are as follows: First, green R&D cooperation between supply chain 
members will positively impact the environment, customer surplus and social welfare. Second, its 




determined by each firm’s own green contribution level, which is dependent on its green R&D 
investment efficiency, spillover and power relationship with its supply chain partners. We also show 
that, under each supply chain power structure, there exists a Pareto improvement region in which 
green R&D cooperation positively impacts all firms in the supply chain, customers and the 
environment. The supply chain power relationship, each firm’s own green contribution level and how 
that level compares to that of its partners also influence this decision region. In the situation that green 
R&D cooperation increases the total profit for the whole supply chain but not the manufacturer or 
retailer, the supply chain can be coordinated through the two-part tariff contract.  
7.1 Research contribution 
This study makes several contributions. First, our research contributes to the green supply chain 
literature (Dai et al. 2017; Xu et al. 2017) by providing a better understanding of how green R&D 
investment cooperation can contribute to the low-carbon supply chain. Our systematic examination, in 
a structured manner, provides supply chain firms with strategic guidance on whether and how to 
engage green R&D investment cooperation with supply chain partners considering their relevant 
green contribution level, technological spillover and power structure. Second, our research 
complements the technology cooperation literature by extending its applications to the context of low 
carbon supply chain management (Ge et al. 2014; Luo et al. 2016; Yenipazarli 2007). We argue that a 
sustainable cooperative relationship requires an improvement in both economic and environmental 
performance as well as a fair distribution of financial benefit gained from green R&D cooperation 
delivering a win-win-win outcome for the environment, individual firms and consumers. Finally, our 
research also makes important contribution to the supply chain power relationship literature 
(Touboulic et al. 2014; Chen and Wang 2015; Chen et al. 2007b) by extending the application to the 
context of low carbon supply chain management. Our systematic examination evidently illustrates the 
influence of supply chain power structure on how green R&D investment cooperation impacts on 
supply chain firms’ financial and environmental performance.    
7.2 Managerial and policy implications  
The results obtained from our study have important managerial and policy implications. From firms’ 
perspective, our research findings provide clear strategic guidance on making appropriate green R&D 
cooperation decisions. The findings should be taken into consideration when a firm is either 




research finding outlines the balanced thresholds, at which, supply chain firms can gain the largest 
economic benefits from green R&D cooperation under different power structures. Moreover, we also 
specify how technological spillover affects supply chain firms’ financial performance individually and 
collectively under the green R&D cooperation. Regardless of industry giants or small firms with green 
credentials, our findings can help firms make optimal strategic and operational decisions to maximise 
financial benefits and positively impact the environment and customers.  
     However, reducing greenhouse gas emissions to tackle climate change is not only a task for 
commercial firms: It also requires global cooperation involving every country and all countries and 
their citizens. From governments’ perspective, policies should be developed to incentivise industry 
leaders with advanced green technological capabilities to cooperate with their domestic and 
international supply chain partners on green technology R&D. For instance, policymakers could 
establish a special green fund that provides easier access to finances for supply chain firms 
cooperating on green R&D and innovations. Furthermore, our results show that enhancing 
technological spillover of supply chain firms will benefit the environment and social welfare. 
Policymakers should develop policies that promote technical exchange and knowledge sharing 
between supply chain firms to enhance low carbon technology diffusion and, in turn, support low 
carbon economy. Finally, as regulators, policymakers should also contribute to fair distribution of the 
financial benefits gained from green cooperation among the supply chain parties since it is essential to 
sustain such a cooperative relationship.    
7.3 Future research directions 
There are several research directions to build on this study. First, this research only considers a 
simple supply chain setting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Many supply chains consist of more 
than two players. It would be interesting to examine how the additional dimensions of competition 
among multiple players affect firms’ behaviour engagement in green R&D cooperation. Second, it 
would be valuable to incorporate demand uncertainty in modelling firms’ cooperation behaviour, as 
firms’ decisions on cooperation are influenced by market uncertainty. Furthermore, the green R&D 
cooperation may be a large project, which requires considerable investment. The short-term profit 
gain from unit carbon emission reduction may not make up for such a high cost. In addition to 




market share that can make up high cost of green R&D investment in long term. One future research 
direction is to consider other long term effects of green R&D in the modelling. Moreover, although 
both firms can gain financial benefit from the green R&D cooperation through centralized investment 
decision or the two-part tariff contract, it is also important to ensure the gained benefit is fairly 
distributed between the cooperative parties. The importance of fairness issues in resource 
allocation/distribution has been well documented and studied in various settings (Bertsimas et al. 2011; 
Ho et al. 2014; Zhou et al. 2016). One future research extension is to incorporate fairness schemes 
such as max-min fairness and proportional fairness (Bertsimas et al. 2011) in the model to ensure fair 
distribution of the gained benefit. Finally, as governments around the world have widely implemented 
different carbon emissions control policies (e.g. carbon taxation; cap and trade), it would be useful to 
study the impact of different policies on firms’ green R&D cooperation behaviour and the 
consequential sustainability performance of the supply chain. 
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= −2𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) is a concave function of 𝑝. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
𝑑𝑝
= 0, we obtain 𝑝 =
𝛼+𝑤𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
2𝛽
. Replace 𝑝 =
𝛼+𝑤𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
2𝛽




−𝛽 < 0 , so 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚)  is a concave function of 𝑤 . Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒𝑚)
𝑑𝑤
= 0 , we obtain 𝑤 =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
2𝛽
. Replace 𝑤 =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
2𝛽




𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟)  and 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) , we obtain 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
𝑑𝑒𝑟













































𝑛𝑚 in 𝑝 =
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽+3𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
4𝛽
 and 𝑤 =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
2𝛽














2) VN non-cooperation model: From Equations (1) and (2), we obtain 
𝑑2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒𝑚)
𝑑𝑤2
= −2𝛽 < 0, and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
𝑑𝑝2







= 0, we obtain 𝑤 =
𝛼+2𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
3𝛽







 and 𝑝 =
2𝛼+𝑐𝛽+2𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
3𝛽
























< 0 , we obtain 𝐺𝑚 <
9
8
 and 𝐺𝑟 <
9
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𝑛𝑣  and 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑣  in 𝑤 =
𝛼+2𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
3𝛽
 and 𝑝 =
2𝛼+𝑐𝛽+2𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
3𝛽

















3) RS non-cooperation model: Assuming that the retailer’s marginal profit is 𝑚, then 𝑝 = 𝑤 + 𝑚. Replace 





2 , then 
𝑑2𝜋𝑚(𝑤,𝑒𝑚)
𝑑𝑤2




we obtain 𝑤 =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽−𝑝𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚+𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟)
𝛽
. Replace 𝑤 =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽−𝑝𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚+𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟)
𝛽




= −4𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) is a concave function of 𝑝. Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
𝑑𝑝
= 0, we obtain 𝑝 =
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽+3𝛾(𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚+𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟)
4𝛽
. Replace 𝑝 =
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽+3𝛾(𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚+𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟)
4𝛽







.  Replace 𝑤 =
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚+𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟)
4𝛽
 and 𝑝 =
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽+3𝛾(𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚+𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟)
4𝛽
 in 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟)  and 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) , we obtain 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟(𝑝,𝑒𝑟)
𝑑𝑒𝑟



















< 0 , we obtain 𝐺𝑟 < 1  and 








, so 𝜋𝑚(𝑤, 𝑒𝑚)  is a concave function of 𝑒𝑚  and 
















𝑛𝑟 in 𝑤 =
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚+𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟)
4𝛽
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2𝛽(2−𝐺𝑚−2𝐺𝑟)
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(2) Cooperation model: 1) MS cooperation model: Replace 𝑝 =
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽+3𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
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> 0, we 
obtain 𝐺𝑚 + 𝐺𝑟 <
2
3









𝑐(𝑒𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) is a joint concave function 




















𝑐𝑚  and 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑚  in 𝑝 =
3𝛼+𝑐𝛽+3𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
4𝛽
 and  𝑤 =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
2𝛽
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. 2) VN cooperation 
model: Replace 𝑤 =
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> 0 , we obtain 𝐺𝑚 + 𝐺𝑟 <
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𝑐𝑣  and 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑣  in 𝑤 =
𝛼+2𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
3𝛽
 and 𝑝 =
2𝛼+𝑐𝛽+2𝛾(𝑒𝑟+𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟𝜃𝑟+𝑒𝑚𝜃𝑚)
3𝛽













. 3) RS cooperation model: Replace 𝑤 =
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚+𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟)
4𝛽



































































> 0, we 
obtain 𝐺𝑚 + 𝐺𝑟 <
2
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𝑐(𝑒𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) is a joint concave function 

















𝑐𝑟  and 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑟  in 𝑤 =
𝛼+3𝑐𝛽+𝛾(𝑒𝑚+𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑚𝑒𝑚+𝜃𝑟𝑒𝑟)
4𝛽
 and 𝑝 =
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, we obtain 𝑤𝑐𝑟 = 𝑐 +
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2𝛽(2−3𝐺𝑚−3𝐺𝑟)




































2 > 0 , 𝑒𝑚









> 0 , 𝑤𝑐 − 𝑤𝑛 =
(2𝐺𝑟+𝐺𝑚)𝑞0
(2−2𝐺𝑚−𝐺𝑟)(2−3𝐺𝑚−3𝐺𝑟)𝛽
> 0 , 𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑛 =
3(2𝐺𝑟+𝐺𝑚)𝑞0
2(2−2𝐺𝑚−𝐺𝑟)(2−3𝐺𝑚−3𝐺𝑟)𝛽
> 0, and 𝑞𝑐 −  𝑞𝑛 =
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(2−2𝐺𝑚−𝐺𝑟)(2−3𝐺𝑚−3𝐺𝑟)









𝑛, 𝑤𝑐 > 𝑤𝑛, 𝑝𝑐 > 𝑝𝑛, and 𝑞𝑐 >  𝑞𝑛. 





























> 0 , 𝑤𝑐𝑣 − 𝑤𝑛𝑣 =
24(𝐺𝑟+𝐺𝑚)𝑞0
(9−8𝐺𝑚−8𝐺𝑟)(9−16𝐺𝑚−16𝐺𝑟)𝛽
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𝑐𝑣 >  𝑒𝑚
𝑛𝑣 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑣 > 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑣 , 𝑤𝑐𝑣 > 𝑤𝑛𝑣 , 𝑝𝑐𝑣 > 𝑝𝑛𝑣 , 
and 𝑞𝑐𝑣 >  𝑞𝑛𝑣.  


































> 0 , 𝑤𝑐𝑟 − 𝑤𝑛𝑟 =
(𝐺𝑟+2𝐺𝑚)𝑞0
2(2−𝐺𝑚−2𝐺𝑟)(2−3𝐺𝑚−3𝐺𝑟)𝛽
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2(2−𝐺𝑚−2𝐺𝑟)(2−3𝐺𝑚−3𝐺𝑟)𝛽
> 0 , and 𝑞𝑐𝑟 − 𝑞𝑛𝑟 =
(𝐺𝑟+2𝐺𝑚)𝑞0
2(2−𝐺𝑚−2𝐺𝑟)(2−3𝐺𝑚−3𝐺𝑟)





𝑐𝑟 >  𝑒𝑚
𝑛𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑟 > 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑟 , 𝑤𝑐𝑟 > 𝑤𝑛𝑟 , 𝑝𝑐𝑟 > 𝑝𝑛𝑟 , 

















, 𝑤𝑐𝑗 > 𝑤𝑛𝑗 , 𝑝𝑐𝑗 > 𝑝𝑛𝑗  and, 𝑞𝑐𝑗 >  𝑞𝑛𝑗 ; 
where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
 






































, 𝑝𝑛𝑗 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑗
); where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
 














. Set 𝐹1(𝐺𝑚) = 4(1 + 9𝐺𝑟)𝐺𝑚
2 + (−4 − 68𝐺𝑟 +
27𝐺𝑟
2)𝐺𝑚 + 32𝐺𝑟 − 32𝐺𝑟


















. From Equation (GC), we obtain 4 + 68𝐺𝑟 − 27𝐺𝑟
2 = 4 + 𝐺𝑟(68 −
27𝐺𝑟) > 0  and (4 + 68𝐺𝑟 − 27𝐺𝑟
2)2 − (2 + 3𝐺𝑟)
2(4 − 4𝐺𝑟 + 81𝐺𝑟
2) = 512(1 − 𝐺𝑟)𝐺𝑟(1 + 9𝐺𝑟) > 0 , then 
𝐺𝑚1























































. Set 𝐹1(𝐺𝑚) = 8𝐺𝑚
2 − 𝐺𝑚(9 + 16𝐺𝑟) + 6(3 − 4𝐺𝑟)𝐺𝑟 , then 𝐹1(𝐺𝑚)  is a 





(9 + 16𝐺𝑟 − √81 − 288𝐺𝑟 + 1024𝐺𝑟




(9 + 16𝐺𝑟 + √81 − 288𝐺𝑟 + 1024𝐺𝑟
2) >
𝐺𝑚1. From Equation (GCV), we obtain (9 + 16𝐺𝑟)
2 − (81 − 288𝐺𝑟 + 1024𝐺𝑟
2) = 192(3 − 4𝐺𝑟)𝐺𝑟 > 0, then 
𝐺𝑚1







(16𝐺𝑟 + √81 − 288𝐺𝑟 + 1024𝐺𝑟




> 𝐺𝑚 . So, if 0 < 𝐺𝑚 <
𝑓𝑟




𝑛𝑣) ; if 𝑓𝑟



























. Set 𝐹1(𝐺𝑚) = 𝐺𝑚
2 (8 − 18𝐺𝑟) + 𝐺𝑚(−16 + 32𝐺𝑟 − 27𝐺𝑟
2) + 8𝐺𝑟 −
10𝐺𝑟
2. If 0 < 𝐺𝑟 <
4
9






, then 8 − 18𝐺𝑟 <
0 and 𝐹1(𝐺𝑚) is a concave function. ∆= (4 − 3𝐺𝑟)
2(16 + 𝐺𝑟(−56 + 81𝐺𝑟)) > 0 means that there are two 









































 (16 − 32𝐺𝑟 + 27𝐺𝑟
2)2 − ((4 − 3𝐺𝑟)√16 − 56𝐺𝑟 + 81𝐺𝑟
2)
2
= 16𝐺𝑟(4 − 5𝐺𝑟)(4 − 9𝐺𝑟) > 0  means that 
𝐺𝑚1
𝑟 > 0. Therefore, if 0 < 𝐺𝑟 <
4
9




































































 and 0 < 𝐺𝑚 < 𝑓𝑟




























. Set 𝐹2(𝐺𝑟) = 𝐺𝑟
2(8 − 18𝐺𝑚) + 𝐺𝑟(−16 +
32𝐺𝑚 − 27𝐺𝑚
2 ) + 8𝐺𝑚 − 10𝐺𝑚
2 . If 0 < 𝐺𝑚 <
4
9







, then 8 − 18𝐺𝑚 < 0 and 𝐹2(𝐺𝑟) is a concave function. ∆= (4 − 3𝐺𝑚)
2(16 + 𝐺𝑚(−56 + 81𝐺𝑚)) >







































𝑚 .  (16 − 32𝐺𝑚 + 27𝐺𝑚
2 )2 − ((4 − 3𝐺𝑚)√16 + 𝐺𝑚(−56 + 81𝐺𝑚))
2
=
16𝐺𝑚(4 − 5𝐺𝑚)(4 − 9𝐺𝑚) > 0 means that 𝐺𝑟1
𝑚 > 0. Therefore, if 0 < 𝐺𝑚 <
4
9































. From Equation (GC), we 




























































. Set 𝐹2(𝐺𝑟) = 8𝐺𝑟
2 − 𝐺𝑟(9 + 16𝐺𝑚) + 6(3 − 4𝐺𝑚)𝐺𝑚 , then 𝐹2(𝐺𝑟)  is a 





(9 + 16𝐺𝑚 − √81 − 288𝐺𝑚 + 1024𝐺𝑚




(9 + 16𝐺𝑚 + √81 − 288𝐺𝑚 + 1024𝐺𝑚
2 ) >
𝐺𝑟1
𝑣 . From Equation (GCV), we obtain (9 + 16𝐺𝑚)
2 − (81 − 288𝐺𝑚 + 1024𝐺𝑚
2 ) = 192(3 − 4𝐺𝑚)𝐺𝑚 > 0, 
then 𝐺𝑟1







(16𝐺𝑚 + √81 − 288𝐺𝑚 + 1024𝐺𝑚










































. Set 𝐹2(𝐺𝑟) = 4(1 + 9𝐺𝑚)𝐺𝑟
2 + (−4 − 68𝐺𝑚 + 27𝐺𝑚
2 )𝐺𝑟 +
32𝐺𝑚 − 32𝐺𝑚
2 . 4(1 + 9𝐺𝑚) > 0 means that 𝐹2(𝐺𝑟) is a convex function. ∆= 4 − 4𝐺𝑚 + 81𝐺𝑚
2 > 0 means 













From Equation (GC), we obtain 4 + 68𝐺𝑚 − 27𝐺𝑚
2 = 4 + 𝐺𝑚(68 − 27𝐺𝑚) > 0  and (4 + 68𝐺𝑚 −
27𝐺𝑚
2 )2 − (2 + 3𝐺𝑚)
2(4 − 4𝐺𝑚 + 81𝐺𝑚
2 ) = 512(1 − 𝐺𝑚)𝐺𝑚(1 + 9𝐺𝑚) > 0 , then 𝐺𝑟1





















> 𝐺𝑟 . 
So, if 0 < 𝐺𝑟 < 𝑓𝑚




𝑛𝑟) ; if 𝑓𝑚


























. Since ((18 +
27𝐺𝑟)√4 − 4𝐺𝑟 + 81𝐺𝑟
2)2 − (4 + 324𝐺𝑟 − 243𝐺𝑟
2)2 = 320(2 − 9𝐺𝑟)





From Propositions 2 and 3, we obtain if 0 < 𝐺𝑚 < 𝑓𝑟
𝑚(𝐺𝑟), 0 < 𝐺𝑚 <
4
9
, and 0 < 𝐺𝑟 < 𝑓𝑚









𝑛𝑚). Therefore, if 0 < 𝐺𝑚 < 𝑓𝑟
𝑚(𝐺𝑟) and 










(2) VN model: From Propositions 2 and 3, we can directly obtain that in the VN model, if 0 < 𝐺𝑚 <
𝑓𝑟



















. Since ((18 +
27𝐺𝑚)√4 − 4𝐺𝑚 + 81𝐺𝑚
2 )2 − (4 + 324𝐺𝑚 − 243𝐺𝑚
2 )2 = 320(2 − 9𝐺𝑚)





From Propositions 2 and 3, we obtain if 0 < 𝐺𝑟 < 𝑓𝑚
𝑟(𝐺𝑚) , 0 < 𝐺𝑟 <
4
9
, and 0 < 𝐺𝑚 < 𝑓𝑟









𝑛𝑟) . Therefore, if 0 < 𝐺𝑟 < 𝑓𝑚












Proof of Proposition 4: From Equations (GC) and (GVC), we obtain 2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟 > 0 and 3 − 4𝐺𝑚 −
4𝐺𝑟 > 0. (1) Recalling 𝐸 = (𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)𝑞, from Lemma 1, we can directly derive that 𝐸
𝑐𝑗 > 𝐸𝑛𝑗. (2) From 





















> 0, then  𝐶𝑆𝑐𝑗 >  𝐶𝑆𝑛𝑗. (3) 
Recalling that 𝑆𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋𝑚 (𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) + 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) + 𝑐𝑒𝐸, we can directly derive that 𝑆𝑊
𝑐𝑗 > 𝑆𝑊𝑛𝑗; where 
𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: (1) MS model: From Equation (GC), we obtain 2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟 > 0 . 1) MS 














































































































2 > 0, then 𝑒𝑚
𝑛𝑚,  𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑚, 𝑤𝑛𝑚 ,  𝑝𝑛𝑚 ,  𝑇𝑟
𝑛𝑚,  𝑇𝑚
𝑛𝑚, and  𝑞𝑛𝑚 all increase in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑟 .  2) 










































































































2 > 0, then 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑚,  𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑚, 𝑤𝑐𝑚,  𝑝𝑐𝑚,  𝑇𝑟
𝑐𝑚,  𝑇𝑚
𝑐𝑚, and  𝑞𝑐𝑚 all increase in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑟. 
(2) VN model: From Equation (GCV), we obtain 9 − 16𝐺𝑚 − 16𝐺𝑟 > 0. 1) VN non-cooperation model: 















































































































2 > 0, then 𝑒𝑚
𝑛𝑣,  𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑣, 𝑤𝑛𝑣,  𝑝𝑛𝑣,  𝑇𝑟
𝑛𝑣,  𝑇𝑚
𝑛𝑣, and 
















































































































2 > 0, then 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑣,  𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑣, 𝑤𝑐𝑣 ,  𝑝𝑐𝑣 ,  𝑇𝑟
𝑐𝑣,  𝑇𝑚
𝑐𝑣 , and  𝑞𝑐𝑣 all 
increase in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑟. 
(3) RS model: From Equation (GC), we obtain 2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟 > 0. 1) RS non-cooperation model: From 



















































































































𝑛𝑟, 𝑤𝑛𝑟 ,  𝑝𝑛𝑟 , and 












































































































2 > 0, then 𝑇𝑟
𝑐𝑟 ,  𝑇𝑚
𝑐𝑟 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑟 ,  𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑟 , 𝑤𝑐𝑟 ,  𝑝𝑐𝑟 , and  𝑞𝑐𝑟  all 
increase in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑟. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: From Equations (GC) and (GCV), we obtain 2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟 > 0 and 9 − 16𝐺𝑚 −
16𝐺𝑟 > 0. 



















3 > 0, then 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛𝑚, 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑚) increases in 𝜃𝑟  and 



















3 > 0, then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛𝑚 , 𝑒𝑚































𝑛𝑚)  increases in 𝜃𝑟  and 𝜃𝑚 . VN non-cooperation model: From Table 2 and 




















3 > 0, 
then 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛𝑣 , 𝑒𝑟




















3 > 0 , then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛𝑣 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑛𝑣)  increases in 𝜃𝑟 






















3 > 0, then 𝜋𝑡
𝑛(𝑤𝑛𝑣 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑛𝑣, 𝑝𝑛𝑣 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑣) increases in 𝜃𝑟  and 𝜃𝑚. RS 



















3 > 0, then 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑛𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟




















3 > 0 , then 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛𝑟 , 𝑒𝑚























3 > 0 , then 𝜋𝑡
𝑛(𝑤𝑛𝑟 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑛𝑟 , 𝑝𝑛𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑟) 










, 𝑝𝑛𝑗 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑛𝑗
)  increase in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑟; where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 




















2 > 0, then 𝜋𝑡
𝑐(𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑚, 𝑝𝑐𝑚 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑚) increases in 
















3 > 0, then 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑚 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑚) increases in 𝜃𝑚. Similarly, from Table 















3 > 0, then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑐𝑚 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑚) increases in 𝜃𝑟 . VN cooperation model: From 




















2 > 0, then 𝜋𝑡
𝑐(𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑣 , 𝑝𝑐𝑣 , 𝑒𝑟

















3 > 0, then 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑣 , 𝑒𝑟




















3 > 0, then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑐𝑣 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑣)  increases in 𝜃𝑟 . RS cooperation model: From Table 2 and 























𝑐𝑟 , 𝑝𝑐𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟















3 > 0, then 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑟) 






2 > 0, then 









3 > 0 , then 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑐𝑟 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑟)  increases in 𝜃𝑟 . 
Therefore, for the cooperation model, 𝜋𝑡(𝑤
𝑐𝑗 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑗
, 𝑝𝑐𝑗 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑗




in 𝜃𝑚, and 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑗 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑗
) increases in 𝜃𝑟; where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 




























= 0, we 
obtain 𝐺𝑚 − 𝐺𝑟 =
2
9













< 0 , so 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑐𝑚 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑚) 
decreases in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑚 , 𝑒𝑟
















𝑐𝑚) increases in 𝜃𝑚  and 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑚 , 𝑒𝑟








𝑐𝑚) achieve their maximum profits. b) VN cooperation model: From 







































< 0, so 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑣 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑣) increases in 𝜃𝑟  and 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑐𝑣 , 𝑒𝑚











> 0, so 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑣 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑣) decreases in 𝜃𝑟  and 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑐𝑣 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑣) increases in 




𝑐𝑣) achieve their maximum profits. c) 














































> 0, so 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑟) decreases in 𝜃𝑟 and 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑐𝑟 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑟) 













< 0, so 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟






𝑐𝑟)  decreases in 𝜃𝑚 . Therefore, only if 𝐺𝑟 − 𝐺𝑚 =
2
9
, then both 𝜋𝑟(𝑝
𝑐𝑟 , 𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑟)  and 
𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑐𝑟 , 𝑒𝑚
𝑐𝑟) achieve their maximum profits. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: From Equations (GC) and (GVC), we obtain 2 − 3𝐺𝑚 − 3𝐺𝑟 > 0 and 3 − 4𝐺𝑚 −
4𝐺𝑟 > 0. (1) Recall 𝐸 = (𝑒𝑚 + 𝑒𝑟)𝑞, from Lemma 2, we can directly derive that both 𝐸
𝑛𝑗 and 𝐸𝑐𝑗  increase 
































































































3 > 0 , then both  𝐶𝑆
𝑛𝑗  and  𝐶𝑆𝑐𝑗  increase in 𝜃𝑚  and 𝜃𝑟 . (3) Recalling 𝑆𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 +
𝜋𝑚 (𝑤, 𝑒𝑚) + 𝜋𝑟(𝑝, 𝑒𝑟) + 𝑐𝑒𝐸 and Proposition 5, we can directly derive that both 𝑆𝑊
𝑛𝑗 and 𝑆𝑊𝑐𝑗  increase 
in 𝜃𝑚 and 𝜃𝑟; where 𝑗 = 𝑚, 𝑣, 𝑟. 
  




= −2𝛽 < 0, so 
𝜋𝑡












































































> 0 , we obtain 𝐺𝑚 + 𝐺𝑟 <
1
2



























𝐼  and 𝑒𝑟
𝐼  in 𝑝 =
𝛼+𝑐𝛽+𝛾𝑒𝑚(1+𝜃𝑚)+𝛾𝑒𝑟(1+𝜃𝑟)
2𝛽
















= −2𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋𝑟









2𝑝𝛽 + 𝑤𝛽 + 𝛾𝑒𝑚(1 + 𝜃𝑚) + 𝛾𝑒𝑟(1 + 𝜃𝑟) = 0. In order to coordinate the supply chain, replace 𝑒𝑚 = 𝑒𝑚
𝐼 ， 
𝑒𝑟 = 𝑒𝑟
𝐼  and 𝑝 = 𝑝𝐼 to aforementioned equation, we get 𝛽(𝑤 − 𝑐) = 0, then 𝑤 = 𝑐.  
In a MS power structure, the manufacturer is the market leader and gain the extra profit from the supply 












2 − 𝑀 = 0， then 








2 . For the manufacturer, 𝜋𝑚
𝑝 (𝑤𝐼 , 𝑒𝑚




















2  is a coordination and Pareto contract for the supply chain. 
In a VN power structure, the retailer and the manufacturer have same supply chain power and they gain 




















2 − 𝑀  and 𝜋𝑚



















2 . In a 







2  is a coordination and Pareto 
contract for the supply chain. 
In a RS power structure, the retailer is the market leader and gain the extra profit from the supply chain 
coordination. So, for the manufacturer, 𝜋𝑚
𝑝 (𝑤𝐼 , 𝑒𝑚
𝐼 ) − 𝜋𝑚(𝑤
𝑛𝑟 , 𝑒𝑚































𝑟 > 0. So, in a RS 








2  is a coordination and Pareto 
contract for the supply chain.  


























2  in a RS power structure.  
 















2 . Set 𝐹1(𝐺𝑚) =
162 − 335𝐺𝑟 + 287𝐺𝑟
2 − 80𝐺𝑟
3 + 192𝐺𝑚
3 (−1 + 2𝐺𝑟) + 4𝐺𝑚
2 (129 − 264𝐺𝑟 + 160𝐺𝑟
2) + 𝐺𝑚(−484 +
978𝐺𝑟 − 880𝐺𝑟
2 + 256𝐺𝑟
3) , 𝐹2(𝐺𝑚) =
𝑑𝐹1(𝐺𝑚)
𝐺𝑚
= −484 + 978𝐺𝑟 − 880𝐺𝑟
2 + 256𝐺𝑟
3 + 576𝐺𝑚
2 (−1 + 2𝐺𝑟) +
8𝐺𝑚(129 − 264𝐺𝑟 + 160𝐺𝑟
2), −1 + 2𝐺𝑟 < 0, then 𝐹1(𝐺𝑚) is a concave function. If 0.2279 < 𝐺𝑟 <
1
2
− 𝐺𝑟 , 




























− 𝐺𝑟) = 25(1 + 𝐺𝑟)












2  and 𝑀
𝑣 > 𝑀𝑟. 
 
